Science, History and Culture: Evolving Perspectives by Johnston, Sean F.











This chapter could be entitled ‘the present and future of history 
of science’.  As the previous chapter suggests, history of science 
has increasingly been re-examined ‘from the inside’.  But not 
only have historians revisited the subject: so too have 
philosophers, sociologists and the wider public.  Together, these 
visions of the subject have reworked its goals, its methods and 
its audiences.  The aim in this chapter, then, is to explore behind 
the scenes to illustrate how scholars have drawn meaning from 
the history of science. 
 
 
philosophers and failure: disputing how 
science works 
 
From the early nineteenth century, the history of science 
became closely associated with philosophy, although, as 
historian Simon Schaffer (b. 1955) and others have argued, the 
writing of scientific history also developed from biographies of 
exemplary practitioners.  Both connections were only to be 
expected.  Mediaeval categories had defined scientific 
knowledge as part of natural philosophy, an understanding 
traceable to Aristotle; and big names like Aristotle provided 
authoritative answers.  The narrower term physics – dropping 
the philosophical association – was substituted increasingly 
during the late nineteenth century, but there were some hold-
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outs.  Scottish universities largely retained the term natural 
philosophy, with Glasgow University’s department being 
reorganized to become the Department of Physics and 
Astronomy as recently as 1986. 
 
Elaborated by William Whewell, the history of science served 
as raw material to construct philosophical understandings of the 
universal nature of knowledge.  He categorized branches of 
scientific knowledge, traced their histories, and coined new 
words (such as physicist, anode and uniformitarianism) to 
describe them.  Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences 
(1837) was followed quickly by The Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences, Founded Upon Their History (1840).  The twinned 
books argued that the successful advance of scientific 
knowledge relied on induction, the generalization of concepts 
and laws from particular examples.  
 
Whewell’s French contemporary (and rival) Auguste Comte, 
introduced in chapter four, also categorized the sciences via a 
historical survey.  Unlike Whewell, Comte suggested that the 
advance of knowledge could be accelerated by a rigorous 
methodology that relied only on observable facts.  ‘Positive’ 
knowledge extended only to what could be experienced directly 
(empirical evidence).  And, as singer Bing Crosby put it, in 
addition to accentuating the positive, it was equally important to 
eliminate the negative: theorization about hidden or abstract 
entities, Comte claimed, was pointless. 
 
Ironically, while the history and philosophy of science became 
closely allied, practicing scientists drew away from both fields 
around the turn of the twentieth century.  Now increasingly 
professionalized and goal-oriented, scientists delved into the 
philosophical justifications of their work less often.  Perhaps the 
last influential scientist-philosophers were Ernst Mach (1838-
1916) and Pierre Duhem (1861-1916).  A confirmed positivist, 
Mach argued that scientific laws are merely short-hand for 
collections of experimental findings.  His book The Economical 
Nature of Physical Inquiry (1882) suggested that ‘the law 
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always contains less than the fact itself’, and promoted the 
trimming of scientific claims to only what was strongly 
supported by evidence.  This rather fundamentalist approach led 
him to reject the atomic hypothesis at the turn of the century on 
the grounds that direct observations were impossible, and the 
indirect evidence was ‘uneconomical’.   
 
French physicist and philosopher Pierre Duhem, on the other 
hand, investigated the problem of constructing scientific 
theories.  His position, known as the Quine-Duhem thesis or the 
problem of under-determination, is that for any set of data a 
large number of theories can be convincingly applied.  In any 
experiment then, the results will not provide sufficient evidence 
to force revision of a theory (this came up in Chapter 5 in the 
discussion of the Michelson-Morley experiment).  Duhem’s 
unsettling conclusion raises questions that were reviewed by 
historians and sociologists of science half a century later: how 
can empirical evidence be related to theories at all, and (more 
fundamentally) what confidence can we have in scientific 
realism – the notion that it is possible to discover the true nature 
of things?    
 
Philosophers, too, were stimulated (and disturbed) by the 
elaboration of new scientific theories such as relativity and 
quantum mechanics.  One outcome was the influential logical 
positivist movement which sprang up in 1920s Vienna and came 
to dominate American philosophy of science into the 1960s.  
Inspired by Comte’s positivism, its members questioned the 
proliferation of concepts that could be only indirectly inferred.  
How, for example, do we know that ‘electrons’ and ‘energy 
levels’ truly exist?  They argued for a more logically-based 
scientific method, and could turn to historical episodes to 
illustrate how successful science had operated in the past. 
 
While scientists themselves were turning away from 
philosophy, then, history of science developed in close 
association with it.  Early twentieth century historians of science 
emphasized the evolution of concepts and the accumulation of 
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factual knowledge – intellectual history and its philosophical 
significance.  The label ‘History and Philosophy of Science’ 
(HPS) identified a successful proto-discipline at prominent 
institutions such as Cambridge.  Part of the reason of the 
success there can be attributed to its location within the Faculty 
of Natural Science.  Academic affiliations were also tight 
elsewhere: the History of Science Division at the University of 
Leeds, for example, was founded in the mid 1950s within its 
Department of Philosophy.  
 
More frequently, though, Philosophy departments pursued the 
philosophy of science without explicit links to the history of 
science.  Notable contributors – each with well established 
explanations and followers – included Karl Popper (1902-1994) 
at the London School of Economics and Thomas Kuhn at the 
University of California, Berkeley.  Both rejected the positivist 
philosophy that was becoming the orthodox explanation for how 
science works, but for distinct reasons.  Popper emphasized 
insights about the scientific method.  Importantly, he 
demonstrated that scientific theories can never be wholly 
proven: at best, they are conditionally confirmed by mounting 
evidence.  In essence, this is a critique of induction.  He 
proposed instead the notion of falsificationism to explain the 
advance of knowledge.  Facts, he argued, could never be 
confirmed to be true in general, but they could be proven false.  
For example, the claim ‘all swans are white’ cannot be proven 
true unless we examine every swan that exists or has existed, 
but it can be proven false merely by finding a single example of 
a black swan.  Swans aside, the same imbalance affects many 
modern claims: we could prove that UFOs or ghosts exist by 
capturing just one, but we can never disprove their existence; 
we may be failing to find them because we are looking in the 
wrong places or at the wrong times!  Science advances, said 
Popper, by testing falsifiable hypotheses.  The remaining set of 
hypotheses not yet proven false represents our working body of 
knowledge.  Some historians argue that there are few examples 
of this method in practice. 
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On the other hand, Kuhn, as we have seen, claimed a different 
use for historical evidence, demonstrating that it did not support 
the notion that science accumulated knowledge inexorably; 
periodically, he showed, there were ruptures of knowledge, and 
new frameworks of understanding (or worldviews) were 
constructed.  The revolutions discussed in chapter three are 
evidence of such periodic convulsions.  Both Popper and Kuhn 
emphasized the importance of theory-making, and so reduced 
the stress on fact-collecting and empirical observation. 
 
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) and Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994), 
both junior associates of Popper, provided their own distinct 
approaches to the philosophy of science.  Lakatos sought to 
reconcile the views of Popper and Kuhn.  Feyerabend’s Against 
Method (1975) argued that science is not a unified body of 
knowledge with any identifiable universal method; instead, it is 
an incoherent patchwork of particular techniques and 
procedures that isolate pockets of knowledge. 
 
As this outline suggests, the history of the philosophy of science 
has interesting parallels with history of science itself.  A series 
of contributors (including Whewell, Comte, Popper, Kuhn, 
Feyerabend and their successors) have reformulated the bases of 
the subject.  As a result, the worldviews of philosophers of 
science have been shaken periodically. 
 
 
science in the post-modern world 
 
As sketched in chapter six, the close alliance between the 
history and philosophy of science has been broadened to other 
disciplines during the late twentieth century.  There has been a 
flourishing of approaches to writing the history of science, and 
to understanding science itself.  These new viewpoints have 
resulted from studies of science ‘from the outside’: from other 
disciplines and even from other belief systems.  This gradual 
process, developing after the Second World War, can be 
described as waves of reorientation for the history of science.  
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Two such changes of direction have been described as the 
‘linguistic turn’ and the ‘social turn’. 
 
 
The linguistic turn 
 
The phrase ‘linguistic turn’ refers to a shift in the history of 
science towards studies of language and discourse – i.e. research 
into the ways that scientific findings have been described, 
communicated and perceived.  This refocusing of attention 
towards language began in Humanities subjects (history, 
literature, cultural and media studies) during the 1960s.  These 
ideas amalgamated developments by philosophers such as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and literary theorists such as 
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004).  Wittgenstein had argued that 
philosophical concepts are intimately tied up with language.  A 
separate development was the method of structuralism, 
conceived first for the study of linguistics but spreading to other 
fields during the 1950s.  Structuralism seeks to find abstract 
patterns or structures within social events, and to determine 
their rules of combination.  Anthropologists such as Claude 
Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), for example, sought to discover the 
‘deep grammar’ of societies by studying their rituals, kinship 
associations and mythology.    
 
By contrast, the next generation of philosophers and critical 
theorists, particularly in France, developed a critique of 
structuralism that, logically enough, has been dubbed post-
structuralism.  Derrida, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and others 
argued that various radical philosophies that were critical of 
Western philosophies illustrated the degree to which Western 
culture itself had defined ways of thought.  Post-structuralists 
argued that the underlying ‘structures’ of society identified by 
structuralists are not universally observable characteristics but 
are, in fact, conditioned or created by culture.  As a result, the 
attempt to apply a scientific approach to social processes is 
inherently biased.  They seek, instead, to understand the world 
by investigating multiple viewpoints or perspectives.  Such a 
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position clearly challenged the interpretations of the history of 
science that had been developed up to the 1960s.  It also 
challenged the traditionally privileged position held for 
scientific knowledge itself. 
 
While its origins are diffuse and definitions are spurned, at the 
heart of the linguistic turn is the conviction that our 
understanding of the world is strongly filtered and shaped by 
language.  Rhetoric, it is argued, can create a vision of the world 
by defining terms and corresponding concepts.  This highly-
constrained perspective can limit or distort our perceptions 
about the natural world.  Taking up this approach, historians of 
science began to study scientific texts in relation to other kinds 
of discourse, such as religious and political.  They sought to 
discover how scientists’ discourse affected the presentation of 
their findings and how texts had been used to persuade 
audiences of their explanations.  This approach probed the 
motivations for scientific accomplishments and related them 
more clearly to the context of their times and to other varieties 
of historical study.  Science, previously explained mainly by the 
logic of reasoning, was now more fully explained in terms of 
ideologies and interests.  One might ask, for example, how we 
can characterize Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle or Louis Pasteur 
by the books they read and wrote.  The attention to scientific 
rhetoric led naturally to wider interest in historical context that 
created these texts.  It also opened the door to the study of 
different national settings for science.  Studies of articles on 
science in popular journals, for example, embedded the field 
more firmly in the scholarship of Victorian culture, and revealed 
differing perceptions of science in the countries of Europe and 
America.   
 
 
The social turn 
 
As suggested by the linguistic turn, growing numbers of 
historians of science began to focus on the rhetorical and human 
factors underlying scientific knowledge.  A closely-related shift 
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in attention from the 1970s was the so-called ‘social turn’.  
Here, too, the roots of change can be found in the ideas of other 
disciplines. 
 
Social history, a branch of historical studies that had been 
growing since the 1950s, called attention to ‘history from 
below’.  Its proponents argued that social norms and beliefs 
could arise from, and be sustained by, the masses rather than 
from figures of authority.  Applied to the history of science, 
social history focused on audiences and different portions of the 
public – by class, education, occupation or national origin – 
rather than on men and women of science.  Histories of science 
could now be devoted to the reception of scientific ideas instead 
of merely to their creation.  Indeed, social history has more 
recently extended to cultural history of science.  This approach 
focuses on the relationship between science and culture, a 
subject that makes sense only if the historian appreciates that 
knowledge may have different cultural expressions or be subject 
to cultural shaping.  For instance, the national preference for the 
concepts of Descartes in France was diminished after the French 
translation and commentary of Newton’s Principia by woman 
of science Émilie du Châtelet.  The fruit of this approach is the 
broader understanding of science as a social process: a 
collective human activity fraught with human emotion, 
motivations and mistakes as well as successes.   
 
A second outcome of the social turn was a new attention to craft 
skills and artisanal knowledge as drivers of science.  As 
suggested by philosopher Jerome Ravetz (b. 1929) during the 
early 1970s, this approach counteracted the traditional interest 
in intellectual history for the field.  Rather than focusing on 
concepts and their mutation, historians of science increasingly 
investigated the importance of process skills.   Historian Myles 
Jackson (b. 1964), for example, has argued that the development 
of spectroscopy by Joseph von Fraunhofer in early nineteenth 
century Germany owed much to his artisanal expertise in 
precision optics. 
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But just as post-structuralism had influenced ‘the linguistic 
turn’, it provided a more radical slant for the ‘social turn’ than 
did social history.  The relationship between social activities 
and scientific findings can be explored one step further: can 
society not merely constrain or filter our scientific practices, but 
also shape our scientific beliefs?  An example of this possibility 
is the investigation of N-rays discussed in chapter five.  The N-
ray studies and claims of René Blondlot had been conditioned 
by his working environment.  The contemporary discoveries of 
x-rays and radioactivity, along with state-of-the art practices of 
measuring the brightness of light and detecting radio waves, had 
made him and his scientific collaborators receptive to 
interpretations that might have seemed improbable in other 
social contexts.  The data reported in papers by several 
laboratories were later judged to be illusory and misguided.  On 
a much larger scale, it can be argued that the Aristotelian 
understanding of the heavens – the Western orthodoxy for 
nearly 2000 years – was supported by prevailing theological 
ideas and trust of ancient authority. 
 
An extension of such anecdotal cases suggests that, at least 
sometimes and for certain periods, scientific facts can be social 
constructs.   
 
Social constructivism: the view that knowledge is a human 
product that is socially and culturally shaped, rather than being 
based primarily on discoverable physical reality. 
 
This new approach had at least two clear consequences.  First, it 
brought scholarship in the history of science closer to other 
fields such as literature, anthropology and sociology.  This new 
cluster of scholarly interests has been described by labels such 
as science studies, science and technology studies (STS) or 
science-technology-society (also abbreviated STS).   
 
The second consequence of these turns has been that they 
diminished the perceived separation between scientific 
knowledge and other forms of human belief.  Another 
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intellectual current for historians of science during the late 
twentieth century came once again from philosophy and 
sociology.  So-called sociology of scientific knowledge (often 
referred to by its abbreviation, SSK) was the product of 
interdisciplinary studies from the 1970s.  One of its principal 
founders, David Bloor (b. 1942), argues that sociological factors 
influence all aspects of science, from the selection of problems 
to funding, from categorization of results to dissemination, and 
from observation to theory construction.  Members of the so-
called Edinburgh School (the Science Studies Unit at the 
University of Edinburgh from the late 1960s) distinguished two 
versions of this viewpoint.  The ‘Weak Program’, they argued, 
applies discussion of social factors merely to erroneous beliefs.  
Thus Blondlot’s N-rays would be attributed to the social 
considerations that flavored his scientific work, while the 
successes of his critics would be attributed solely to intellectual 
factors and rational, objective judgment.  As suggested by the 
pejorative label ‘weak’, the members of the Edinburgh School 
favored a different approach, which they dubbed the ‘Strong 
Program’.   
 
According to the Strong Program, historical, sociological and 
philosophical investigations of scientific practice should strive 
to be neutral with respect to our current beliefs about the truth 
or falsity of claims.  This approach, known as symmetry or 
methodological relativism, gives equal attention to historical 
episodes that today are seen as ‘successes’ and ‘failures’.  The 
history of science is thereby broadened to document and analyze 
not just how we came to hold our present scientific beliefs, but 
also the numerous blind alleys, failed initiatives and errors of 
the past.  This is not merely a matter of being ‘fair’ to the 
collection of historical actors, but also to better understand the 
strategies and philosophies of knowledge pursued by our 
forebears.  It also extends history of science into the present 
and, indeed, the future: the scientific practices and strategies of 
the past inform those of the present, and so historians, 
anthropologists, philosophers and policy-makers have much to 
teach each other. 




A more radical position of the Strong Program, however, is its 
commitment to social constructivism.  The original expositions 
set out to investigate the hypothesis that all scientific knowledge 
is socially constructed to some extent, and possibly entirely so 
constructed.  This claim certainly opposed most scholarship in 
history of science up to that time, but members of the Edinburgh 
School and others employed historical case studies as the basis 
of such research. 
 
An early and highly influential example is the still controversial 
historical hypothesis put forward in 1971 by American historian 
of science Paul Forman (b. 1937).  The ‘Forman thesis’ argues 
that the content of early quantum mechanics was shaped by the 
culture in which it developed, interwar Weimar Germany.  The 
unexpected defeat of Germany in the First World War, it is 
claimed, caused a loss of confidence among the educated elite in 
rationality, deterministic processes and even causality itself.  In 
this cultural environment, Weimar physicists opted to support 
the uncertainty principle proposed by Werner Heisenberg rather 
than alternate interpretations of quantum mechanics.  As a result 
of these cultural pressures actively shaping the subject in the 
German context and its rapid international spread, the 
Copenhagen interpretation became the new orthodoxy.  
Forman’s claims were followed by a generation of historical 
studies to further explore the social and cultural mechanisms 
that could influence the content of science. 
 
Other variants of the sociology of scientific knowledge, notably 
attributed to French scholar Bruno Latour (b. 1947), argued 
from the 1970s for more radical understandings of science, 
technology, knowledge and technical products.  His early work 
Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts 
(1979, co-written with sociologist Stephen Woolgar (b. 1950)) 
unconventionally explored science by applying the methods of 
anthropology to a biology laboratory.  These perspectives are 
beyond the scope of this book, but they, too, continue to 
motivate current research by some historians of science. 




Such theorizing about the scientific enterprise may appear arid 
and divorced from the concerns of previous generations of 
historians of science, who more frequently adopted a narrative 
style (that is, constructing carefully-researched stories of 
scientific episodes and historical figures).  They may also fail to 
tempt the casual reader with their intellectual vistas.  However, 
these radical positions, during the early 1990s, assumed a public 
and even political dimension.  Dubbed the ‘Science Wars’ by 
the American media, the differences in viewpoint between 
radical constructivists and practicing scientists were played out 
in magazine articles, campus debates and television interviews.  
In their crudest form, they illustrated a polar division between 
so-called ‘relativists’ and ‘realists’.  The relativists argue, with 
varying degrees of compromise, that scientific belief is 
influenced, shaped or determined by the society in which it is 
practiced.  The realists, calling upon older and still widely 
accepted philosophical foundations, argued that human 
knowledge based on rational scientific approaches is ultimately 
unlimited in its accuracy and power to describe the natural 
world.  Both extremes accommodate nuanced approximations, 
making the ‘wars’ more a spectrum of discord.  While the 
‘Science Wars’ cooled down, they are a potent illustration of the 
relevance of history of science in contemporary culture. 
 
 
anti-scientific movements and popular 
belief 
 
The section above limited itself to changing scholarly opinion 
since the Second World War.  But, as discussed in chapter five, 
one of the most dramatic features of science over that period 
was the rise and fall of public confidence in scientific authority.  
So, alongside the scholarly turns, we can track changing 
understandings of science in popular culture. 
 
Popular criticisms of science have roots as old as the scientific 
revolution and have been supported by a range of scholars.  
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During the second half of the eighteenth century, the grand 
aspirations of the Enlightenment were criticized by scholars 
such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).  Rousseau 
criticized the power and adequacy of rationalism to create the 
better world, and argued that humans inevitably were corrupted 
by society.  He suggested that the advancement of knowledge 
had concentrated power in the hands of governments to the 
detriment of individual liberty.   
 
Supported by such ideas, Romanticism became an important 
cultural and intellectual force influencing literature, art and 
music through the mid nineteenth century.  The movement 
represented, in part, a resistance to Enlightenment claims.  It 
stressed direct individual experience, imagination, emotion and 
intuition over cold rationality.  While no consensus can be 
identified, Romanticism challenged the scope of reason and 
emphasized subjective human qualities.  By extension, this 
challenged universal laws and scientific methodologies such as 
reductionism and quantification as means of describing and 
explaining the complexities of the natural world.  Incidentally, 
such perspectives inform some contemporary scientific 
concerns, too: environmentalism and so-called ‘deep ecology’ 
owe much to the Romantic movement, in opposition to 
technologically-oriented solutions that can be linked more 
closely to the worldviews of the mechanical philosophers and 
many of the other practitioners that have been the focus of this 
book.  In exchange for the expanding methods of science, 
proponents of Romanticism offered holistic, multi-layered 
description founded on particular experience.   
 
 Reductionism: the breaking down of a problem into more 
easily explainable parts, or the simplification and generalization 
of an explanation in terms of a more fundamental one (note: 
there is a distinct definition that may be encountered: in biology, 
where reductionism can refer to a materialist explanation of 
life). 
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Holism: the consideration of multiple scales and interconnected 
contributions making up an effect. 
 
The most influential scientific expression of this was 
naturphilosophie.  Most widely supported in the German-
speaking world by exponents such as Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
(1749-1832), this philosophy emphasized the 
interconnectedness of nature.  Its approach promoted 
alternatives to the ‘new science’ of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, rejecting the procedure of dividing 
problems into more easily manageable portions.  Goethe, for 
example, championed explanations of light and color that were 
distinctly at odds with those of Newton a century earlier.  A 
drawback of his color theory was that, unlike Newton’s, it was 
difficult to make predictions from it. 
 
While the late nineteenth century witnessed a growing popular 
acceptance of progress as discussed in chapter four, the pace of 
scientific and technological change provoked varied critical 
responses.  Romanticism had offered an early alternative, but 
quite distinct counter-forces emerged in the twentieth century.  
Emerging in Switzerland during the First World War, Dadaism 
was a cultural movement that expressed a rejection of logic and 
reason.  Through art, theatre, manifestos and design, Dadaists 
expressed irrationality and chaos as a reaction to the conformity 
and perverse ‘logic’ that they argued had led to war.  Within a 
decade the movement had fostered surrealism.  Surrealist 
artists, writers and performers juxtaposed unrelated and dream-
like images, communicating a rejection of logic and orderly 
sequential thought. 
 
In their very distinct ways, the Romantic, Dadaist and Surrealist 
movements were important examples of opposition to the 
techno-scientific basis of modern culture that was expanding 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  They 
challenged the completeness of scientific explanation and 
offered multiple perspectives in place of general explanation.  
Although Dadaism and surrealism were relatively elite and 
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narrow in membership, they affected the wider public at least 
peripherally and temporarily.   
 
A more direct expression of popular anti-scientific sentiments 
was through the adoption of non-western religious, medical and 
metaphysical ideas.  The New Age movement, for example, can 
be characterized as an individualistic approach to spiritual 
exploration and consciousness.  Like the artistic movements 
described above, it criticizes the constraints and limitations of 
the scientific approach, and argues for a holistic understanding 
of the natural world.  Although the term New Age circulated 
from the early 1970s, there are identifiable links with ideas that 
developed during the late nineteenth century, such as 
spiritualism and alternative medicines.  Here, again, universal 
definitions cannot be constructed but the body of ideas draws 
upon a wide range of religious concepts from many cultures.  
Some concepts, such as meditation and reincarnation, have links 
to Eastern religions.  An attention to mystical and mysterious 
dimensions of knowledge has roots in a number of world 
religions, including Christian and Jewish sects and Shamanism.  
The collection of practices may also amalgamate a variety of 
medical traditions from other cultures.   Some of these are 
ancient and widespread, such as acupuncture (China) and 
Ayurvedic medicine (India).  Others represent new 
interpretations of old concepts, such as aromatherapy’s adoption 
of ideas traceable to alchemy.  Admittedly this sparse survey 
cannot do justice to the forms of knowledge that challenge 
science; this book highlights the twists and turns of the 
scientific perspective and can only sketch a background against 
which to contrast it. 
 
There is one further aspect of these alternatives that can be 
mentioned, though.  Some critical perspectives do not merely 
challenge conventional science: they sometimes have sought to 
incorporate and extend it.  Some alternative medicines have 
recognizable scientific links, such as therapies based on magnets 
or light.  New Age thinking is informed by certain sciences, 
notably aspects of psychology and ecology.  Its interpretations 
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of quantum mechanics, for example, draw connections between 
consciousness, causality and spirituality.  New Age claims 
promote notions of knowledge (epistemologies) that extend 
beyond the methods and theories of science, but frequently 
make reference to them.  Like spiritualism, one of its disparate 
roots, some New Age beliefs borrow from the terminology of 
science.  Where spiritualists detected ‘vibrations’ from the spirit 
world, promoters of ‘crystal therapies’ may invoke 
‘resonances’, ‘energy levels’ and ‘recharging’; alternative 
therapists may refer to ‘toxins’.  Such adoption of scientific 
jargon with unconventional meanings has been described as 
pseudo-scientific.  The criticism of practicing scientists usually 
focuses on the lack of reliable evidence for such claims, and the 
lack of precision of their foundational ideas. 
 
Pseudoscience: a body of knowledge that claims scientific 
authority without appropriate scientific methodology.   
 
Not all of the counter-forces to modern science are to be found 
in older or non-western traditions.  Stalwart opposition to 
Darwinism, for example, has in recent decades been buttressed 
by (piecemeal) arguments drawn from the history and 
philosophy of science.  Rather like supporters of phrenology in 
the early nineteenth century, certain supporters of creationism 
have attempted to construct a ‘creation science’ that adopts 
some features of scientific methodology.  They may cite certain 
scientists as figures of authority for their claims (although most 
have credentials outside biology) or may point to inadequately 
explained observations as crucial refutations of evolutionary 
theory.  The work of historians to reveal the complex history of 
many scientific claims may be used by creationists to hint that 
no scientific orthodoxy is safe and authoritative.  Such pick-
and-mix scholarship nevertheless is inevitably patchy and 
underlain by a clearly non-scientific foundation: that one 
particular theory – the Biblical account of creation – is beyond 
critical investigation and adjustment.  By contrast, Darwinian 
evolution and Mendelian genetics have adapted to new 
empirical evidence.   




The most serious challenge to the consensus of biologists was 
probably the set of claims made by Ukrainian agronomist 
Trofim Lysenko (1898-1976), who argued during the 1940s and 
50s for the inheritance of acquired characteristics (rather similar 
to the ideas of Lamarck some 150 years earlier).  His methods 
of mutating crops by vernalization (acquisition of spring-
hardiness of crops by exposing young plants to winter 
conditions) were carefully tested in other countries and found to 
be irreproducible.  The rise of Lysenkoism, which promised 
higher crop yields, was supported in the Soviet Union by active 
suppression of Mendelian genetics until 1964.  What had, for a 
time, been Soviet science was recast as pseudoscience. 
 
Having distinct aims and memberships, other forms of 
opposition to specific scientific claims have become 
increasingly visible from the late twentieth century.  The case of 
British opposition to the mumps-measles-rubella (MMR) 
inoculation during the late 1990s is a typical example.  The case 
is interesting beyond the British context precisely because it 
became controversial only there; it begs the question of what 
conditions were remarkable at that time in that particular 
country.  A small-scale study by a doctor suggested that the 
MMR injection could be correlated with subsequent emergence 
of autism in a small number of inoculated children.  Unswayed 
by large-scale trials and statistical analysis – the methodology of 
modern medicine – many anxious parents rejected the perceived 
dangers of inoculation in the face of unverified anecdotal 
claims.  This did not necessarily represent a blanket rejection of 
science and medicine, but often a construction of seemingly 
more acceptable explanations: for instance, that the vaccine 
would be safer if divided into three separate inoculations for 
mumps, measles and rubella, respectively; that the British 
Medical Association, National Health Service and Department 
of Health responded directly and unanimously to demands of 
their political masters, and so were suspect; or that ‘rogue’ 
doctors would routinely be attacked when they threatened 
industrial, institutional and professional establishments.  Even 
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for rational audiences, conspiracy theories may prove more 
compelling than plodding, and increasingly invisible and 
incomprehensible, science.  Such claims are generally 
challenged by practicing scientists who argue that, even taking 
political, social and cultural factors into account, bodies of 
expert and independent peers (operating in different countries 
under distinct political and religious systems, for example) tend, 
in the long run, to agree on questions of scientific fact.  
 
These very recent challenges to scientific knowledge and 
practice are not unprecedented: as this book suggests, different 
approaches to knowledge have always coexisted.  What makes 
them remarkable is their increased visibility in the past few 
generations after a long decline in the west since the scientific 
revolution.  Old and new, they are topics of direct relevance to 
historians of science.  Not only are they linked to ideas as old as 
modern science itself, but they can be expected to influence 
twenty-first century thinking about science and its integration 
into wider culture.  The history of science, therefore, is firmly 
embedded in analysis of the present-day. 
 
 
between the universal and the particular  
 
We live in interesting times, to paraphrase an ancient Chinese 
blessing.  History of science today is more vibrant and relevant 
than ever in the past.  It is enriched – and made contentious – by 
other disciplines and perspectives.  The debates of the ‘science 
wars’ have diminished considerably, but proponents of both 
extremes continue to lob volleys through historical studies.  As 
a result, the hot spots in the history of science are equally 
changeable and multi-dimensioned.  The field offers timely 
opportunities for research and exploration based on every type 
of human scholarship. 
 
This beginner’s guide has suggested that the observation, 
innovation in technique, logical reasoning and application of 
knowledge so characteristic of science are widely-shared human 
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attributes readily discernible across human societies.  It has 
argued that natural phenomena are an inexhaustible resource to 
motivate human curiosity and research.  Equally universal are 
the drives to explain patterns and to apply knowledge in the 
pursuit of power and control.  The history of science focuses on 
the myriad contexts in which these human attributes have been 
expressed and shaped. 
 
Alongside this seemingly ubiquitous drive, though, are 
dramatically different cultural expressions.  The activities we 
call ‘science’ have emerged and mutated at particular times and 
places and been shaped and applied in those environments.  The 
techniques of how best to recognize and weigh up these events 
and contexts have motivated – and sometimes divided – 
historians and scientists.  The challenging and continuing goal 
for history of science is to detect and explain the subtle 
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